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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
frequently exercised its exclusive statutory jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) to hear appeals from the U.S. Court of
1
International Trade. With this broad authority to hear the full
panoply of cases involving the complex and organic regime of U.S.
trade laws and regulations, the Federal Circuit each year must rule on
complex and diverse questions of law. The Federal Circuit issued
nineteen international trade-related precedential opinions in the

* Associate, International Trade & Regulatory practice, Alston & Bird LLP,
Washington, D.C.; J.D., cum laude, American University Washington College of Law; B.A.,
Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Fitch’s practice includes trade litigation—including
Section 337 investigations before the International Trade Commission—and
compliance with customs law, export controls, and economic sanctions programs.
While in law school, Mr. Fitch served as a law clerk to the U.S. Senate Committee on
the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on the Constitution. This Area Summary represents
the views of the Author alone and not those of Alston & Bird LLP or its clients.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2006).
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2009 calendar year, spanning issues as varied as tariff classification,
drawback requests, antidumping duty proceedings and the
constitutionality of the now-repealed Byrd Amendment.
This Article reviews the Federal Circuit’s 2009 decisions dealing
with international trade-related matters. While some decisions
turned on extremely fact-specific issues—often relevant only to that
action’s litigants—others will undoubtedly alter agency practice for
the foreseeable future at U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(Customs), the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) and the
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC). This Article separates
the 2009 international trade decisions of the Federal Circuit into two
main areas: (1) customs law and (2) trade remedies at Commerce
and the ITC.
I.

U.S. CUSTOMS LAWS

Customs cases once again represented a significant portion of the
Federal Circuit’s 2009 international trade decisions. More than half
of the Federal Circuit’s eleven 2009 Customs decisions concerned
2
tariff classification.
Others concerned drawback requests and
requests for refunds of fees incurred by importers in the ordinary
3
course of business. One case concerned the ability of brokers to seek
judicial review of license revocations caused by their failure to file
4
reports concerning their brokering activities. The Federal Circuit
generally expresses deference to the decisions of Customs, but has
not shown any reluctance to intervene on behalf of private litigants
when circumstances warrant.
A. Tariff Classification
In 2009, the Federal Circuit decided five tariff classification cases.
These cases involved disagreements between importers or
manufacturers and Customs about where certain products fall within
the voluminous Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTSUS), a system of ten-digit codes that purports to cover the full
panoply of products imported into the United States. These ten-digit
codes are significant to importers, as they determine the duty rate

2. United
States
Court
of
Appeals
for
the
Federal
Circuit,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/dailylog.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010); see infra Part
I.A.
3. See infra Parts I.B, I.D.
4. Schick v. United States, 554 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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attached to a product and whether its country of origin entitles it to
5
preferential treatment.
The Federal Circuit ruled on the classification of Canadian cut
6
lumber in Millenium Lumber Distribution Ltd. v. United States.
Millenium appealed the Court of International Trade’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the government that Customs
correctly classified Millenium’s lumber under HTSUS heading 4407,
which covers “[w]ood sawn or chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled,
whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a thickness
7
exceeding 6 mm.”
Millenium argued that 215 entries of its cut lumber, including twoby-three, two-by-four and two-by-six lumber, cut to various lengths
ranging from five to twenty feet and entered between October 1999
and January 2001, should be classified either under HTSUS
subheading 4418.90.40 as “[b]uilders’ joinery and carpentry of wood”
8
or under HTSUS heading 4421 as “[o]ther articles of wood.” After
Customs notified Millenium in December 2000 that it liquidated the
merchandise under HTSUS heading 4407, Millenium filed two timely
9
protests.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed. The court found as a
threshold matter that determining the meaning of tariff provisions is
a question of law, while determining whether specific imports fall
10
within certain tariff provisions is a question of fact.
Citing the
Explanatory Note to HTSUS heading 4407, which specifies that
heading 4407 covers all wood and timber thicker than 6 mm “[w]ith a
few exceptions,” the Federal Circuit upheld Customs’ classification of
11
Millenium’s lumber under HTSUS heading 4407.
The court
rejected classification under HTSUS heading 4418, because
Millenium’s lumber had not undergone sufficient working to

5. See generally U.S. International Trade Commission, Tariff Information Center,
By Chapter Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (last visited Apr. 7,
2010), http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/bychapter/index.htm (establishing the
HTSUS, listed by chapter and general notes).
6. 558 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
7. Id. at 1327 (quoting Millenium Lumber Distribution Co. v. United States,
No. 02-00595, 2007 WL 1116148, at *4 (Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 16, 2007)).
8. Id. at 1328 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
9. Id.
10. Id. (citing Universal Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 491 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
11. Id. at 1331 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in original);
see also Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 282 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(finding that Customs’ classifications are presumptively correct, and that the
protesting party bears the burden of proving otherwise).

1080

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1077

12

constitute “joinery and carpentry.”
The court also rejected
classification under the catchall provision in HTSUS heading 4421
because—under General Rule of Interpretation 3(a)’s rule of relative
specificity, which provides that goods prima facie classifiable under
two or more headings are properly classified in the most specific
13
heading—it deemed HTSUS heading 4407 more descriptive.
14
In Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
upheld an importer’s protest of Customs’ classification of deodorizer
15
distillate (DOD), a residue from edible soybean oil production.
Customs classified DOD under HTSUS subheading 3824.90.28, a
“catchall provision” for “[c]hemical products and preparations of the
chemical or allied industries . . . not elsewhere specified or included:
16
Other . . . : Other.” Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) conceded that
HTSUS heading 3824 covered the subject products but contended
that other headings were more descriptive, and filed suit at the Court
of International Trade seeking classification under HTSUS heading
3825, a duty-free heading that provides for “[r]esidual products of
the chemical or allied industries, not elsewhere specified or
17
included.”
The Court of International Trade granted summary judgment for
18
It viewed the explanatory note to HTSUS
the government.
subheading 3825 as providing an exhaustive list of four substances—
alkaline iron oxide, residues from antibiotics manufacture,
ammoniacal gas liquors and spent oxide—that formed the complete
19
list of items subject to classification in that subheading. The Federal
Circuit reversed, finding HTSUS subheading 3825 appropriate and
20
more descriptive than HTSUS subheading 3824.
First, the Federal Circuit found that “[DOD] falls within the
ordinary meaning of the term ‘residual products,’” as it is left over
21
from the distillation of soybean oil.
The court rejected the
government’s argument that the list of products in the Explanatory
Note to HTSUS subheading 3825 was exhaustive due to “a notable
12. Millenium Lumber, 558 F.3d at 1329–30 (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
13. Id. at 1330–31.
14. 561 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
15. Id. at 1310.
16. Id. (quoting U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Headquarters Ruling No. 967288
(Mar. 10, 2005)).
17. Id. at 1310–11 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
18. Id. at 1311.
19. Id. (citing Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1347,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
20. Id. at 1317–18.
21. Id. at 1313–14.
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absence of language in the Explanatory Note confining the list to the
22
enumerated items or suggesting the list is exhaustive.” Because the
court found no evidence that Congress intended for HTSUS
headings 3824 and 3825 to be mutually exclusive, it deemed DOD
23
prima facie classifiable in both headings. Pursuant to General Rule
of Interpretation 3(a)’s rule of relative specificity, the Federal Circuit
deemed the phrase “residual products” as used in HTSUS
subheading 3825 more descriptive than general “chemical products”
24
as used in HTSUS subheading 3824.
25
In Value Vinyls, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit evaluated
the proper tariff classification of plastic-coated fabric material,
imported in sheets and used to make truck covers, dividers,
26
upholstery, signs and other products. The Court of International
Trade classified the product in HTSUS subheading 3921.90.11 as “a
product with textile components in which man-made fibers
predominate by weight over any other single textile fiber” because
27
the product is made entirely of man-made fibers.
The Federal
28
Circuit agreed with this classification and affirmed.
The government argued that the word “predominate” in HTSUS
subheading 3921.90.11 required at least two components and could
29
not apply to products made of only one type of fiber. In rejecting
this argument, the Federal Circuit accepted the Court of
International Trade’s analysis that products made of only man-made
fibers appeared in HTSUS subheading 3921.90.11, dating back to
that subheading’s predecessor provision in the Tariff Schedule of the
30
United States (TSUS), prior to harmonization.
Citing legislative
history indicating that the harmonization of the tariff schedule
intended to adopt internationally accepted terminology without
affecting classification or duties, the Federal Circuit found that no
22. Id. at 1315. The Federal Circuit rejected a similar line of argument in Airflow
Tech., Inc. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1287, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that
explanatory notes cannot override the plain meaning of a tariff provision, as
explanatory notes “are not legally binding” (internal citations and quotations
omitted)).
23. Archer Daniels, 561 F.3d at 1316–17.
24. Id. at 1317.
25. 568 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
26. Id. at 1375.
27. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Customs originally classified the goods
under subheading 3921.90.19, HTSUS; Value Vinyls filed a protest seeking
classification in Subheading 3921.90.11, HTSUS. Id. at 1376.
28. Id. at 1375.
29. Id. at 1377.
30. See id. at 1377–79 (reasoning that, when the TSUS was harmonized into the
HTSUS, no change in meaning was intended, and that wholly man-made fibers were
then classified in the companion provision in the TSUS).
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other HTSUS provision provided for wholly man-made fibers as did
31
the TSUS predecessor provision to HTSUS subheading 3921.90.11.
Thus, Value Vinyls’ man-made fibers were properly classified under
32
HTSUS subheading 3921.90.11.
33
presented the
United States v. UPS Customhouse Brokerage, Inc.
question of whether certain alleged misclassifications by UPS
Customhouse Brokerage, Inc. also gave rise to multiple violations of
19 U.S.C. § 1641, which obligates customs brokers to exercise
34
reasonable supervision and control over their business. The Federal
Circuit agreed with the Court of International Trade and with
Customs that UPS misclassified certain merchandise, but vacated and
remanded the Court of International Trade’s holding that UPS failed
to exercise reasonable supervision and control over its business based
35
on those misclassifications.
The dispute arose from UPS’s classifications under HTSUS
heading 8473, which covers parts and accessories of automatic data
36
processing (ADP) machines. Specifically, UPS classified sixty entries
under HTSUS subheading 8473.30.9000 between January and May
37
2000.
Customs initiated eight separate penalty actions covering
these sixty entries and argued that 8473.30.9000 required ADP
machine parts to themselves contain a cathode ray tube (CRT),
38
rather than merely be part of a computer that contained a CRT.
UPS paid some of the penalties, but Customs filed suit at the Court of
International Trade in December 2004 to enforce the unpaid portion
39
of the penalties (approximately $75,000).
UPS unsuccessfully
sought a summary judgment declaration that Customs may only assess
40
one penalty for a maximum $30,000 under 19 U.S.C. § 1641.
After a bench trial, the Court of International Trade found that
UPS misclassified the ADP machine parts and failed to exercise

31. See id. at 1378–80 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 548 (1988) (Conf. Rep.);
Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530, 532–33 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also
Institution of Investigation for the Conversion of the Tariff Schedules of the United
States into the Nomenclature of the Harmonized System, 46 Fed. Reg. 47,897, 47,897
(Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 30, 1981)) (stating that the move from the TSUS to the
HTSUS did not involve a change in the definition of the fiber itself, which previously
included man-made fibers).
32. Id. at 1380.
33. 575 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
34. Id. at 1377.
35. Id. at 1377–78.
36. Id. at 1378.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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41

reasonable supervision and control in so doing. UPS appealed, and
the Federal Circuit affirmed Customs’ and the Court of International
Trade’s finding of misclassification but reversed and remanded on
42
the section 1641 reasonable supervision issue.
Regarding its classifications, UPS argued that HTSUS subheading
8473.30 divides items based on whether the ADP machine of which
43
they are a part or accessory contains a CRT. The Federal Circuit:
(1) ruled that “subheading 8473.30 demonstrates that there are two
types of ‘parts and accessories’: those ‘not incorporating a [CRT]’
and ‘other,’” and thus rejected UPS’s line of argument; (2) found
that HTSUS subheading 8473 actually differentiated between ADP
machine parts and accessories with and without a CRT; and (3)
44
affirmed Customs’ classification in HTSUS subheading 8473.
In reversing and remanding the Court of International Trade’s
decision on UPS’s section 1641 liability, the Federal Circuit reasoned
that Customs had not considered the ten factors that it must evaluate
45
under 19 C.F.R. § 111.1. Though the Federal Circuit deferred to
Customs’ right to interpret its own regulations, the Federal Circuit
cautioned that “this discretion does not absolve Customs of its
obligation under the regulation to consider at the least the ten listed
46
factors.” The court thus reversed and remanded for further analysis
as to whether UPS violated 19 U.S.C. § 1641 in light of the
47
19 C.F.R. § 111.1 factors.
In its second wood- and lumber-related classification decision of
2009, the Federal Circuit considered the proper classification of
48
laminated flooring panels in Faus Group, Inc. v. United States. Faus
Group, Inc. made the flooring panels at issue out of a fiberboard core
3 49
with a density of 0.85 to 0.95 g/cm . The panels are nonstructural
41. Id. at 1377.
42. Id. at 1377–78.
43. Id. at 1380. UPS argued that, under the “last antecedent rule,” which
provides that a limiting clause or phrase modifies only the word or phrase it
immediately follows, the provision in subheading 8473.30 that reads “[n]ot
incorporating a [CRT]” modifies the language in subheading 8473, HTSUS, “[p]arts
and accessories . . . .” Id. at 1381 (internal quotations omitted). This argument
proved unsuccessful, as the Federal Circuit ruled it would “strain[] logic and
grammar.” Id. at 1382.
44. Id. at 1381.
45. Id. at 1382–83. Since the regulation at issue says that Customs “will” consider
them, the Court added that “‘[w]ill’ is a mandatory term, not a discretionary one.”
Id. at 1382 (citing New England Tank Indus. of N.H., Inc. v. United States, 861 F.2d
685, 694 (Fed Cir. 1988)).
46. Id. at 1382.
47. Id. at 1383.
48. 581 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
49. Id. at 1370.
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finished articles to be installed by their end-users over an existing
50
51
structural subfloor. Each panel is grooved to facilitate assembly.
Customs classified these panels under HTSUS heading 4411, which
provides for “[f]iberboard of wood or other ligneous materials,
52
whether or not bonded with resins or other organic substances.”
Faus protested and sought classification under HTSUS subheading
4418, which provides for “[b]uilders’ joinery and carpentry of wood,
including cellular wood panels and assembled parquet panels;
53
shingles and shakes.” Customs denied Faus’s protest, and Faus filed
54
suit at the Court of International Trade.
In what the Federal Circuit described as a “fifty-three page
analysis . . . that can only be described as Talmudic in its breadth and
thoroughness,” the Court of International Trade deemed the floor
panels prima facie classifiable under both HTSUS headings 4411 and
55
4418. Under General Rule of Interpretation 3(a)’s rule of relative
specificity, the Court of International Trade determined that HTSUS
heading 4411 is the more specific of the two headings and thus more
56
appropriate for classification. Faus timely appealed to the Federal
57
Circuit.
The Federal Circuit sided with Faus and reversed the Court of
58
Citing Note 4 to Chapter 44 of the
International Trade.
Harmonized System—which excludes wood products finished to the
extent that they acquired “the character of articles of other headings”—the
Federal Circuit analyzed whether Faus’ laminate floor panels had
been processed to the extent that they had the character of articles in
59
other tariff headings. The Federal Circuit adopted the Court of
International Trade’s conclusion that Faus’ products are prima facie
classifiable in both HTSUS headings 4411 and 4418 but appeared
sympathetic to Faus’ reading of Note 4 to Chapter 44, that fiberboard
processed such that it is prima facie classifiable in HTSUS heading
60
4418 is thus excluded from HTSUS heading 4411.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Customs chose the eight-digit subheading
4411.19.40,
HTSUS, a residual provision for “[f]iberboard of a density exceeding 0.8
g/cm3: Other: Other: Other.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
53. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1371 (citing Faus Group, Inc. v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1244,
1249–65 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1374–75.
59. Id. at 1373.
60. Id. at 1373–74.
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The Federal Circuit also employed a General Rule of
Interpretation 3(a) analysis to avoid a final interpretation of Note 4
to Chapter 44, and instead based its holding on the determination
that HTSUS heading 4418’s requirement that wood products be
processed makes it more specific than HTSUS heading 4411, which
61
has no such processing requirement. The court added that HTSUS
heading 4411 is broader than HTSUS heading 4418 because it covers
any fiberboard product with the character of an article under
another heading “as long as it was created using one of the many
62
enumerated processes in Note 4.”
B. Valuation Issues
The only valuation-related decision issued by the Federal Circuit
concerned penalties levied against an importer for a multi-year
double-invoicing scheme that Customs alleged served to substantially
undervalue imports of Mexican frozen produce and deprive the
63
government of more than $600,000 in duty revenue.
The Federal Circuit reaffirmed penalties assessed against an
importer found guilty of a double-invoicing scheme to suppress the
64
entered value of its goods in United States v. Inn Foods, Inc. The
government alleged that Inn Foods, Inc. and its now-defunct Cayman
Islands-based affiliate SeaVeg fraudulently entered frozen produce
from and with the cooperation of six Mexican growers between 1987
65
and 1990.
Inn Foods, SeaVeg and the Mexican growers agreed upon a
double-invoicing system, in which the growers would issue a “factura”
invoice to Inn Foods or SeaVeg with an invoice number, produce
66
description and price. The price on this factura did not represent
the price actually paid to the grower or the market value of the
produce, and was in fact “substantially lower” than either of those
67
figures. Inn Foods and SeaVeg would provide these facturas to their
customs brokers, who would use it to enter the goods into the United

61. See id. at 1373–75 (citing Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437,
1441–42 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (stating that the heading with the most specific
description shall be preferred to headings with a more general description).
62. Id. at 1374.
63. United States v. Inn Foods, Inc., 560 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
64. Id. This was the Federal Circuit’s second review of this case. Id.
65. Id. at 1341–42. Inn Foods and SeaVeg shared a parent company, operated
out of the same facility, shared employees and otherwise acted as alter egos. Id. at
1341.
66. Id. at 1341.
67. Id.
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States through Customs. After receipt of the goods, Inn Foods and
SeaVeg would create a second invoice with the original invoice
number and produce description, but with the higher price reflecting
the produce’s market value, and would then send it to the grower as
69
an order confirmation. Inn Foods or SeaVeg would initially pay
seventy percent of the higher amount, with the balance months later
after the parties could determine the final market price of the
70
produce.
Customs began to examine the entries made on behalf of Inn
71
Foods and SeaVeg in 1988. In 1989, Customs’ third formal request
for documentation led to the discovery of records indicating that the
actual value of the entered produce vastly exceeded the values listed
72
on the facturas used for entry purposes and presented to Customs.
After learning that Customs intended to investigate the case formally,
Inn Foods added disclaimers to its entries that stated, in relevant part,
“[t]he value being used on shipments . . . is strictly for customs
clearance” and that “[l]iquidation . . . is to be withheld until the
importer of record . . . is able to complete the audit of their files and
73
arrive at a true transaction value.”
The government filed suit against Inn Foods in 2001 under
19 U.S.C. § 1592, alleging that this fraudulent invoicing system
74
deprived the government of significant duties owed. The Court of
International Trade initially dismissed the suit as time-barred, but the
75
Federal Circuit reversed. On remand, the Court of International
Trade held a bench trial and ruled that Inn Foods submitted the
76
materially false facturas with intent to defraud Customs. Inn Foods
faced a monetary penalty of $7.5 million under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1592(c)(1) and unpaid duties of $624,602.55 under 19 U.S.C.
77
§ 1592(d).
The Court of International Trade found Inn Foods

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1341–42.
72. Id. at 1342.
73. Id. at 1344–45.
74. Id. at 1342.
75. United States v. Inn Foods, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003),
rev’d, 383 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
76. See United States v. Inn Foods, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1357–59 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2007), aff’d, 560 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing that Inn Foods was
involved in the scheme and explaining that the values given to the facturas were far
less than later invoices for the same goods, which led to Inn Foods paying less duties
that it owed to Customs).
77. Id. at 1361–62.
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liable for the entire penalty amount because it acted as either an alter
78
ego or aider and abettor of SeaVeg.
On appeal, Inn Foods contended that it acted merely with
negligence when it filed false invoices and not with any fraudulent
79
intent. In rejecting this theory, the Federal Circuit held that the
evidentiary record confirmed the Court of International Trade’s
determination that Inn Foods knew of the facturas’ falsity, and knew
that its brokers would use the facturas to enter the subject produce
80
into the United States. The court then called on precedent from
the other circuit courts to confirm that “[i]nferring fraudulent intent
from the knowing use of false invoices is hardly unique to the
81
customs context.” The Federal Circuit also noted that Inn Foods
and SeaVeg concealed the existence of the double-invoice system,
82
even from their brokers. Moreover, Inn Foods and SeaVeg knew
from their brokers that the values on the facturas were material to the
83
produce’s entry and Customs’ valuation process.
Inn Foods claimed that the disclaimers added to the facturas in
84
1989 “belie[d] any possibility that intent to defraud existed.” The
Federal Circuit disagreed for three reasons. First, the statement that
the invoices existed “strictly for customs clearance” at best suggested
that “the invoices contained a mere calculational error,” when in
85
actuality Inn Foods presented intentionally falsified values. Second,
the disclaimers’ suggestion of a pending audit to determine the
produce’s value was implausible because Inn Foods possessed and
kept in its records both the facturas and the true invoices, and thus

78. Id. at 1356–57.
79. See Inn Foods, 560 F.3d at 1343 (explaining that fraudulent intent requires
that a defendant “knowingly enter[] goods by means of a material false statement”
(quoting United States v. Hitachi Am., Ltd., 172 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1999)));
see also 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e)(2) (2006) (placing the burden on the United States to
prove fraudulent intent by “clear and convincing evidence”).
80. See Inn Foods, 560 F.3d at 1343 (citing Inn Foods, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1354 n.12)
(using as an example of Inn Foods’ knowledge of the facturas’ falsity a letter from a
Mexican grower to SeaVeg which noted that the supplier would ship Broccoli Spears
valued at $0.50/lb. with a factura listing them at $0.28/lb).
81. See id. at 1343 (citing United States v. Marek, 548 F.3d 147, 151–52 (1st Cir.
2008) (inferring fraudulent intent from the use of false invoices in a tax fraud case)).
82. See id. at 1344 (noting that on at least one occasion SeaVeg told an inquiring
broker that the factura values were low because it “obtained the produce at a good
price”).
83. See id. (detailing that in one case, SeaVeg received detailed training on how
Customs determined its duties, and one of Inn Foods’ brokers sent Inn Foods
“itemization of costs, including a copy of the undervalued factura that had been
presented to Customs and the duties paid based on that factura”).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1344–45.

1088

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1077
86

did not need an audit to learn the entered produce’s true value.
Third, the statement that Inn Foods would correct any valuation
errors rang hollow because Inn Foods never filed any actual
87
corrections with Customs.
Finally, Inn Foods challenged its liability for the entire sum of
88
Though the Federal Circuit
$624,602.55 in unpaid duties.
conceded Inn Foods’ argument that Congress intended that
“normally only importers of record and their sureties are liable for
89
duty,” it also found that 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) “suggests that the party
liable for penalties under [19 U.S.C. § 1592(a)] would also be liable
90
under [19 U.S.C. § 1592(d)] for the lost duty.” The Federal Circuit
further reasoned that Congress intended for parties liable as aiders
and abettors to face liability for the duties lost by the government as a
91
direct result of aiding and abetting.
Thus, Inn Foods remained
liable for the full amount of unpaid duties.
C. Jurisdictional Issues
The only purely jurisdictional issue presented to the Federal
Circuit in 2009 concerned the Court of International Trade’s ability
to review the revocation of a customs broker’s license for that
broker’s failure to file a required periodic report of the broker’s
business activity.
92
In Schick v. United States, the Federal Circuit decided that the
Court of International Trade lacks authority to review Customs’
decision to revoke a broker’s license for failure to file a triennial
93
status report. The plaintiff, a customs broker for more than twenty
years, failed to file a triennial status report on its due date and failed
again to do so within the sixty-day grace period referenced in a letter
94
sent to him by the applicable Customs Port Director. Two months
after Customs revoked the plaintiff’s license, he requested a hearing
and a withdrawal of the revocation under 19 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(2)(B),
86. Id. at 1345.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1346 (explaining Inn Foods’ argument that, since liability rested on a
violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d), which applied only to importers, Inn Foods could
not be found to violate that portion of the statute because it was not an importer).
89. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. §§ 1484–85 (2006); United States v. Blum, 858 F.2d 1566,
1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
90. Id. (pointing also to the broad language in 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) empowering
Customs to collect any duties lost “as a result of a violation of subsection (a)”).
91. See id. at 1346–48 (concluding that “Congress intended to continue to impose
liability for unpaid duty on any party guilty of fraud or aiding and abetting fraud”).
92. 554 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
93. Id. at 995.
94. Id. at 993–94.
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which pertains to disciplinary proceedings against customs brokers.
Customs denied the request and reasoned that the license revocation
constituted an operation of law under 19 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1), and
that the governing statute did not afford the plaintiff a right to a
96
hearing.
Contending that Customs should have followed the procedures for
disciplinary proceedings, the plaintiff sought relief in the Court of
International Trade. The Court exercised jurisdiction under 28
97
U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4), but rejected the plaintiff’s request for relief.
98
Citing Retamal v. United States Customs & Border Protection, the Federal
Circuit rejected the Court of International Trade’s basis for
99
The Federal Circuit
exercising jurisdiction in this matter.
reaffirmed its holding in Retamal that revocation of a customs broker
license for failing to file a triennial report does not relate to the
disciplinary provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1641(g), and is not referenced
100
anywhere in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a)–(h) or (i)(1)–(3). In remanding
this proceeding to the Court of International Trade, the Federal
Circuit concluded that “19 U.S.C. § 1641(g) provides the Secretary
with independent authority to revoke a customs broker’s license, an
action that is unreviewable in the Court of International Trade,” and
advised the court to consider whether the transfer statute,
101
28 U.S.C. § 1631, applies.
D. Other Customs Issues
The Federal Circuit considered whether an importer’s repeated
102
Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT)
payments when none were
required should be treated as a remediable “inadvertence” or an
irremediable mistake of law in Esso Standard Oil Co. (PR) v. United
103
States.
Congress amended the HMT statute in 1988 to exempt
shipments between Alaska, Hawaii or “any possession of the United
95. Id. at 994; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(2)(b) (2006) (setting forth the process
by which a customs broker may respond to the notice of suspension and the
procedure for conducting a hearing to determine if discipline is warranted).
96. Schick, 554 F.3d at 994.
97. Id. at 994–95.
98. 439 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
99. Schick, 554 F.3d at 995.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 995–96 (citing Butler v. United States, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2006)).
102. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 4461–62(a) (2006) (defining the HMT as a fee
imposed on “port use” by commercial vessels, charged ad valorem at 0.125 percent of
the value of the vessels’ cargo).
103. 559 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (mentioning that the trial court defined
Esso’s HMT payment as a “correctable inadvertence”).
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States” to the U.S. mainland, Alaska, Hawaii or a U.S. possession.
Customs, which Congress tasked with administering the HMT laws,
had not updated its regulations to reflect this new exemption for
105
shipments between U.S. possessions.
Esso intentionally made $339,000 in unnecessary HMT payments
between 1993 and 1997 for petroleum products it shipped between
106
the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Customs liquidated these
entries between 1994 and 1997 without change and without
107
Esso realized that possession-torefunding Esso’s HMT payments.
possession shipments enjoyed an exemption from the HMT later in
1997 and filed three separate requests for HMT refunds, which
Customs treated as requests for reliquidation under 19 U.S.C.
108
§ 1520(c). Customs denied all three requests because it considered
the HMT payments “a mistake of law . . . [not] correct[able] under
109
19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1).”
The Court of International Trade heard Esso’s challenge to
Customs’ denial, and in a summary judgment ruling found that the
HMT payments constituted a correctable “inadvertence” under 19
U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) resulting from Customs’ failure to update its
110
regulations to accord with the 1988 HMT amendments. On appeal,
the Federal Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade’s
holding that two of the three requests for reliquidation constituted
correctable “inadvertences” and affirmed that the third request was
111
time-barred.

104. 26 U.S.C. § 4462(b)(1) (1988).
105. Esso, 559 F.3d at 1298–99 (explaining that the amendment was designed to
“alleviate the tax burden on domestic shipping between these ports”).
106. Id. at 1299 (mentioning that Esso made over eighty-seven liquidation entries
during this period).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1299–1300 (noting that Customs determined that the requests did not
qualify as timely protests under 19 U.S.C. § 1514). The requests came more than
ninety days after liquidation of the entries, and thus would not have qualified as
timely protests in 1997. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1994), amended by Pub.
L. No. 108-429, § 2103(2)(B), 118 Stat. 2434, 2597–98 (2004) (extending the protest
deadline to 180 days).
109. Esso, 559 F.3d at 1300; see 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) (allowing for corrections
based on clerical errors or “inadvertence[s]”), repealed by Pub. L. 108-429, § 2105, 118
Stat. 2434, 2598 (2004)).
110. See Esso, 559 F.3d at 1300–01 (citing Esso Standard Oil Co. (PR) v. United
States, No. 98-09-02318, 2007 WL 4125999 at *3 (Ct. Int’l Trade Nov. 20, 2007)).
However, the Court of International Trade agreed with Customs, that one of the
three requests was time-barred because it came more than one year after the last
covered liquidation. See id. at 1300–01.
111. See id. at 1308 (explaining that the request was time-barred because Esso had
notified Customs of its HMT payments more than one year following liquidation).
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Esso advanced four theories to defend its request for HMT refunds:
first, that a Customs refund procedure in place for entities that pay
quarterly HMT fees—instead of importers that pay per entry, as Esso
112
did—should apply to Esso in this case; second, that a 1989 telex
from Customs Headquarters created an alternative avenue for
113
claiming HMT refunds; third, that the refund requests actually
114
qualified as “exactions” under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(3); and fourth,
that the statutory time limits of the applicable Customs statutes
115
The Federal Circuit rejected all four
should be equitably tolled.
116
theories.
First, the Federal Circuit held that the subject refund procedure
did not apply to importers at all, and cited Swisher International, Inc. v.
117
United States, to confirm that a timely protest represented the sole
118
avenue for importers to recover HMT payments. Second, the court
declined to create a new refund procedure based on a 1989 telex
because the stated purpose of that telex was merely to summarize the
1988 HMT amendments, and not to create any procedures beyond
119
what the 1988 amendments specified.
Third, the court rejected
Esso’s “exaction” argument, which relied on Swisher, because Swisher
120
involved a quarterly HMT payer and not an importer. Finally, the
court declined to adopt Esso’s equitable tolling argument because
the statutory exemption from HMT payments took effect five years
prior to Esso’s initial HMT overpayment, and “[e]quitable tolling
121
cannot excuse this lack of diligence.”
The Federal Circuit then held as a general matter that Customs’
lack of diligence in failing to update its regulations in accordance
with the 1988 amendments did not offset importers’ lack of diligence
122
in understanding the HMT rules.
In this regard, the court ruled
that “an error is not an ‘inadvertence’ if it is the result of negligent
inaction or an advertent misunderstanding of the law, regardless if
112. Id. at 1301–02.
113. Id. at 1303.
114. See id. at 1303–04 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(3), amended by Pub. L. No.
108-429, § 2103, 118 Stat. 2434, 2598 (2004).
115. Id. at 1304.
116. Id. at 1306–08.
117. 205 F.3d 1358, 1368 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
118. Esso, 559 F.3d at 1302–03.
119. Id. at 1303 (noting also that Esso could not identify any instance in which
Customs issued a refund on those grounds).
120. Id. at 1304. The government claimed that Esso’s “exaction” theory would
permit any importer to file a timely request for reliquidation once Customs denied a
protest as untimely. Id.
121. Id. at 1305.
122. See id. at 1304–05 (noting that the error could have been avoided if Esso had
made any effort to review the statute).
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the inaction or misunderstanding was originally the fault of Customs
123
or the importer.”
124
In Aectra Refining & Marketing, Inc. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit considered a claim for a refund of HMT and Merchandise
Processing Fee (MPF) payments on certain petroleum products
subsequently used to produce export goods, commonly known as
125
drawback.
Aectra Refining and Marketing, Inc. imported
petroleum products, paid customs duties, MPFs and HMTs, and
subsequently exported finished petroleum products between 1987
126
and 1997.
The issue before the Federal Circuit was not whether
Aectra’s imports and exports qualified for drawback, but rather
whether Aectra made a timely drawback claim—normally within
127
three years.
Aectra timely filed ten requests for drawback between 1997 and
1998, but listed only the duties paid and omitted the MPF and HMT
128
payments.
At the time, Customs’ regulations did not allow for
drawback on MPF or HMT payments, but Aectra conceded that it
knew Customs’ policy in this regard was subject to ongoing judicial
129
review.
After Aectra filed its drawback claim—but while those
claims could be timely amended or re-filed—the Federal Circuit
determined that MPF payments were recoverable under drawback
130
but that HMT payments were not.
Congress later amended the
131
drawback statute in 2004 to permit the recovery of HMT payments.
Though Aectra never amended its drawback claims during the
three-year statutory period, it filed a protest prior to Congress’ 2004
amendments, requesting MPF and HMT on the same entries for
132
which it sought drawback in 1997 and 1998.
Customs denied this
123. Id. at 1306–07.
124. 565 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
125. Id. at 1366 (requiring Customs to refund 99% of “any duty, tax, or fee
imposed under Federal law upon entry or importation” of merchandise that is later
“exported, or . . . destroyed under customs supervision; and . . . is not used within the
United States before such exportation or destruction”) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1313(j),
(p) (2006)).
126. Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1366.
127. Id. The statutory period for a drawback claim is three years. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1313(r)(1) (“A drawback entry and all documents necessary to complete a
drawback claim . . . shall be filed or applied for, as applicable, within 3 years after the
date of exportation or destruction . . . .”).
128. Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1367. HMT and MPF payments are not eligible for
drawback. See 19 C.F.R. § 191.3(b) (2009).
129. Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1367 (citing Textport Oil Co. v. United States, 1 F. Supp.
2d 1393 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1998), rev’d, 185 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
130. Textport, 185 F.3d at 1296, cited in Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1367.
131. Miscellaneous Trade & Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-420, § 1557, 118 Stat. 2434, 2579 (2004).
132. Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1368.
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133

protest, and Aectra appealed to the Court of International Trade.
Aectra argued that the 2004 drawback amendments suspended the
three-year limit on HMT drawback claims, that its original drawback
claims were sufficiently complete so as to entitle it to HMT and MPF
payment refunds and that the futility of such claims based on
Customs’ policy at the time the drawback claims were filed rendered
134
them unnecessary. The Court of International Trade rejected these
135
arguments and affirmed Customs’ denial of the claims.
In affirming the Court of International Trade, the Federal Circuit
clarified that Congress’ 2004 drawback amendments, instead of
creating a new right to HMT refunds, merely clarified that such
136
refunds were always available under the statute.
Citing Supreme
Court precedent, the Federal Circuit found nothing in the 2004
amendments that suggested intent to waive or otherwise modify the
137
longstanding three-year statute of limitations on drawback claims.
The Federal Circuit also rejected Aectra’s argument that it did not
have to include HMT and MPF payment amounts in its drawback
request to complete a claim because 19 C.F.R. § 191.51(b) defines a
“complete” claim as including a full calculation of the amount of
138
drawback due.
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Aectra’s
argument that requesting HMT and MPF payment refunds at the
139
time it filed drawback requests was futile and thus not required.
Applying Supreme Court precedent in the area of tax law, the
Federal Circuit reasoned that “futility does not excuse the failure to
140
file a proper claim for limitations purposes.”
141
In Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States (Heartland VII), the
Federal Circuit ruled that the Court of International Trade must treat
the Circuit’s customs classification decisions as retroactively
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Aectra Refining & Marketing, Inc. v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 2d
1318, 1327 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007), aff’d, 565 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
136. Id. at 1369–70.
137. Id. at 1370. The court cited Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
696–98 (1979), for the proposition that newly enacted laws by Congress are
presumptively harmonious with existing law and judicial concepts, thus rendering a
lack of express modification of the three-year period in the 2004 amendments
dispositive. See Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1370.
138. Id. at 1371–72 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 191.51(b) (1998)).
139. Id. at 1373–74.
140. Id. at 1373. In so concluding, the court referenced United States v. Clintwood
Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511, 1515–16 (2008), where the Supreme Court held
that a party must have submitted a tax claim in order to preserve the right later to
sue on the subject-matter of the claim, even though the party had little reason to
believe that the IRS would accept it. See Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1373.
141. 568 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Heartland VII).
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142

applicable. Heartland By-Products’ dispute with Customs began in
1995, when Customs issued a ruling letter classifying Heartland’s
prospective sugar syrup imports as exempt from the Tariff Rate
143
Quota (TRQ) duties on sugar.
In 1999, after Heartland had
established its sugar refining business and had commenced
importing significant quantities of sugar syrup into the United States,
Customs revoked its ruling letter and reclassified Heartland’s sugar
144
syrup as subject to the substantially higher TRQ duties. Heartland
filed suit at the Court of International Trade before Customs’
145
revocation and reclassification took effect. In Heartland I, the Court
of International Trade determined that Customs’ revocation was
146
In
unlawful and exempted Heartland’s imports from TRQ duties.
Heartland II, the Federal Circuit reversed Heartland I and upheld
147
Customs’ reclassification. After the Heartland II decision, Heartland
148
stopped importing the sugar syrup at issue.
Although Customs did not liquidate or reliquidate most of
Heartland’s entries at the TRQ rate after the Heartland II mandate
issued, some entries were liquidated or reliquidated at the TRQ rate
149
prior to its issuance.
Heartland protested these liquidations and
reliquidations, while Customs sought more than $65 million in
150
unpaid TRQ duties. Heartland also sought a judgment at the Court
of International Trade that any liquidations or reliquidations made
prior to the Heartland II mandate should not be subject to the TRQ
rate, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
151
§ 1581(h). After Heartland appealed another suit dismissed by the
152
Court of International Trade, the Federal Circuit reversed and
concluded that the Court of International Trade had ancillary
142. Id. at 1366.
143. Id. at 1362 (citing U.S. Customs & Border Prot., New York Ruling No. 810328
(May 15, 1995), available at http://rulings.cbp.gov (search “NY 810328”)).
144. Id. Customs’ authority to revoke rulings and reclassify products comes from
19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (2006). In this case, the reclassification increased Heartland’s
duties “by approximately two orders of magnitude.” Heartland VII, 568 F.3d at 1362.
145. Id.
146. Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States (Heartland I), 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324,
1345 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999), rev’d, 269 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
147. Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States (Heartland II), 264 F.3d 1126, 1137
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
148. Heartland VII, 568 F.3d at 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
149. Id. at 1363.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. In this suit, Heartland sought a declaratory judgment that Customs could not
liquidate or reliquidate Heartland’s entries at TRQ rates. See Heartland By-Prods.,
Inc. v. United States (Heartland IV), 341 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1286–87 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2004), rev’d 424 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The court dismissed the suit for lack of
jurisdiction. Id. at 1290.
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jurisdiction to decide the scope of the Federal Circuit’s Heartland I
153
decision.
On remand, the Court of International Trade granted Heartland’s
motion for summary judgment and ruled that Customs must
liquidate any entries made by Heartland before the Heartland II
154
mandate issued at the non-TRQ rate.
The court reasoned that
retroactive liquidation at the TRQ rate would “undermine the
155
purpose of pre-importation review.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit
156
reversed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Supreme Court’s general rule
157
that judicial decisions have retroactive effect.
The court rejected
Heartland’s argument that the pre-importation review afforded by
28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) represented an exception to this general rule,
finding in the legislative history for that provision evidence that it was
intended as “a very narrow and limited exception to th[e] rule” that
the Court of International Trade “does not possess jurisdiction to
review a ruling . . . unless it relates to a subject matter presently
158
within the jurisdiction of the United States Customs Court.”
The Federal Circuit also determined that, contrary to Heartland’s
contention that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) would be rendered meaningless
if importers could not rely on section 1581(h) decisions while they
remained subject to appeal, the pre-importation process merely
existed to allow importers the chance to challenge Customs rulings
159
and exhaust all appeals before importing the goods at issue. Thus,
the Federal Circuit found that its Heartland II decision applied
retroactively to entries liquidated or reliquidated before the Heartland
160
II mandate issued.
In its final Customs-related decision of 2009, Agro Dutch Industries,
161
Ltd. v. United States,
the Federal Circuit considered whether
Customs’ liquidation of entries after the Court of International Trade
153. See Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States (Heartland V), 424 F.3d 1244,
1245 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
154. See Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States (Heartland VI), 521 F. Supp. 2d
1386, 1392–93 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007), rev’d 568 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
155. Id. at 1392.
156. Heartland III, 568 F.3d at 1362.
157. Id. at 1365 (citing Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993)).
158. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1235, at 46 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729, 3758).
159. Id. at 1365–66.
160. Id. at 1369. Heartland also argued in its appeal that Customs should not be
allowed to seek unpaid TRQ duties on merchandise liquidated at the non-TRQ rate,
but the Federal Circuit found the issue moot because “Customs will not seek to
collect the TRQ duties it assessed in its liquidations and reliquidations before the
Heartland II mandate issued.” Id. at 1368.
161. 589 F.3d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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issued an injunction barring their liquidation but before that
injunction took effect, mooted pending claims for reliquidation at a
162
newer, lower duty rate. The Federal Circuit decided that it did not,
and in that regard affirmed the holding of the Court of International
163
Trade.
After the Department of Commerce published the final results of
its second administrative review in the Court of International Trade
of an antidumping duty order on preserved mushrooms from India,
Agro Dutch Industries, Ltd. sought review of its 27.80% antidumping
164
duty margin.
Agro Dutch moved for a preliminary injunction to
prevent liquidation of its covered entries during the pendency of its
165
The government consented to this request, even though
action.
Agro Dutch filed it outside of the thirty-day deadline normally
166
required by the Court of International Trade rules of practice.
The Court of International Trade granted Agro Dutch’s request for
an injunction, which took effect five days after service on certain
167
Commerce and Customs personnel.
The government requested
this five-day grace period to avoid “an inadvertent violation” of the
injunction due to lack of notice by the applicable government agents
168
or delay in dispensing the required instructions.
Commerce had previously issued liquidation instructions to
169
Customs after its final administrative review results published.
On
the same day that Agro Dutch served the injunction on the
appropriate Customs and Commerce personnel, “Customs acted on
those [prior] instructions and liquidated nearly all of Agro Dutch’s
170
entries.”
After “extensive” additional proceedings, Commerce recalculated
171
Agro Dutch’s antidumping duty rate from 27.80% to 1.54%.
The
Court of International Trade sustained this significantly lower duty
rate on review, and ordered that the entries be reliquidated at the
172
lower duty rate.
Since Customs personnel had already liquidated nearly all of Agro
Dutch’s entries at the higher duty rate on the same day that Agro
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 1189.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1189–90.
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Dutch served the initial injunction, the government argued that the
173
reliquidation request was moot. The Court of International Trade
rejected this line of argument, noted that the injunction issued
before the liquidations took place, and attributed the liquidations to
174
“what might best be charitably described as ‘inadvertence.’”
The
Court of International Trade backdated the injunction and held that
not granting relief would cause “manifest injustice” to the non-party
importer of record, “which was likely to be rendered insolvent unless
175
the entries were reliquidated at the proper, lower duty rate.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that, under Zenith
176
Radio Corp. v. United States, court actions in which liquidation has
177
However, the Federal
already occurred are ordinarily mooted.
Circuit noted that it has previously acknowledged the existence of
178
exceptions to that rule.
When liquidation occurs in spite of an
injunction to the contrary, for example, the Federal Circuit held that
“not only does the trial court retain jurisdiction, but a broad array of
remedies . . . [are] available to the court to rectify the unlawful
179
liquidation.”
Since the injunction was issued solely to prevent liquidation
pending a decision on Agro Dutch’s challenge, the Federal Circuit
was skeptical that Customs’ mass liquidation on the day that the
180
injunction was served amounted to merely a mistake.
Indeed, the
Federal Circuit emphasized that the five-day grace period “was not
intended to allow the government to ‘rush in’ to liquidate the
181
relevant entries and thereby avoid the effect of the injunction.”
Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed that Customs’ arguably suspicious
liquidation of the enjoined entries did not moot Agro Dutch’s

173. Id. at 1190.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 710 F.2d 806 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
177. 589 F.3d at 1190 (citing Zenith Radio Corp., 710 F.2d at 810, for the
proposition that, in certain circumstances, liquidation would constitute irreparable
injury).
178. Id. at 1191.
179. Id. at 1192. For examples of remedies, the court referenced Allegheny
Bradford Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1171 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004), in
which the court refunded monies exacted pursuant to enjoined liquidation, and
AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2003), in
which the court ordered the matter returned to status quo prior to liquidation
following illegal acts by Customs.
180. See Agro Dutch, 589 F.3d at 1193 (suggesting that inadvertence was a dubious
excuse because “the five-day window was apparently added [specifically] only to
ensure against subjecting Customs officials to contempt sanctions for an inadvertent
liquidation”).
181. Id.
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request for reliquidation at the corrected, substantially lower duty
182
rate.
II. TRADE REMEDIES LAWS
Commerce and the ITC share the responsibility for conducting
183
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. Antidumping
investigations attempt to combat “dumping” of products at less than
184
fair value in the United States from other countries. Commerce has
the responsibility of determining whether products are entering the
United States and being sold at less than fair value, while the ITC
determines whether this activity injures or threatens to injure a
185
domestic industry in the subject goods.
Countervailing duty
investigations seek to determine whether a foreign government or
186
public entity is subsidizing the manufacture of the subject goods.
A. Department of Commerce
In 2009, the Federal Circuit decided seven cases involving
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. Interestingly, all
of these decisions stemmed from Commerce’s, and not the
International Trade Commission’s, role in these investigations.
187
In Belgium v. United States,
the Federal Circuit reviewed
Commerce’s liquidation instructions treating certain imports of
stainless steel plate in coils (SSPC) as steel of Belgian—not German—
origin, and thus subject to antidumping and countervailing duties on
188
Belgian SSPC. Plaintiffs-appellants Arcelor Stainless USA, LLC and
Arcelor Trading USA, LLC imported SSPC and made cash deposits in
compliance with the antidumping and countervailing duty orders,
but alleged that it had mistakenly designated some of the SSPC as of
189
Belgian origin when it was actually of German origin.
Because
182. Id. at 1194.
183. United States International Trade Commission, Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Investigations, http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 551 F.3d 1339 (Fed Cir. 2009).
188. Id. at 1341; see also Antidumping Duty Orders; Certain Stainless Steel Plate in
Coils from Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan,
64 Fed. Reg. 27,657, 27,756 (May 21, 1999); Notice of Amended Final
Determinations: Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium, Italy and South Africa;
and Notice of Countervailing Duty Orders: Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from
Belgium, Italy and South Africa, 64 Fed. Reg. 25,189, 25,288 (May 11, 1999).
189. Belgium, 551 F.3d at 1344 (citing Ugine & Alz Belgium, N.V. v. United States,
391 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1287 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005) (Arcelor I), rev’d, 452 F.3d 1289
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
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Arcelor appealed the results of Commerce’s first administrative
review, albeit on other grounds, the subject entries were not
190
liquidated.
Prior to the fourth administrative review, Arcelor discovered that it
should have entered as of German origin some of the SSPC entered
under the antidumping and countervailing duty orders during the
191
first administrative review period.
Arcelor believed, under the
“substantial transformation” doctrine, that the SSPC at issue was of
German origin because the steel was hot rolled in Germany and not
192
further cold rolled in Belgium.
Arcelor filed timely protests with
Customs under 19 U.S.C. § 1514 and sent letters to Customs seeking
to correct the origin designations and collect a refund of the
193
deposits. Based on this logic, Arcelor did not include the SSPC that
it considered of German origin in its questionnaire responses during
194
the fourth administrative review.
Commerce accepted Arcelor’s argument and issued liquidation
instructions alongside the fourth administrative review that “‘imports
of SSPC hot rolled in Germany and not further cold rolled in
Belgium are not subject to the antidumping duty order on SSPC from
Belgium. Entries of this merchandise made on or after 05/01/02
195
should be liquidated without regard to antidumping duties.’”
In contrast, Commerce issued liquidation instructions that the
entries covered by the first administrative review remain subject to
196
antidumping and countervailing duties.
Arcelor filed suit in the
Court of International Trade to challenge the liquidation instructions
197
specific to the first administrative review.
After the Federal Circuit initially remanded the Court of
International Trade’s denial of the plaintiffs’ joint motion for a
198
preliminary injunction, the Court of International Trade held that

190. Id. (citing Ugine & Alz Belgium, N.V. v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1333,
1336 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007) (Arcelor IV)).
191. Id. at 1344.
192. Id. at 1345 (quoting Arcelor IV, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1337, n.5).
193. Id. (citing Arcelor I, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1287 and Arcelor IV, 517 F. Supp. 2d at
1338).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1345 (quoting Dep’t of Commerce, Message No. 5182203, Liquidation
Instructions for Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium Produced by Ugine &
ALZ, N.V. Belgium (July 1, 2005)).
196. Id. at 1345–46 (citing Dep’t of Commerce, Message No. 5189204, Liquidation
Instructions for Stainless Steel Plate Coils from Belgium (July 8, 2005), and Dep’t of
Commerce, Message No. 5199201 Liquidation Instructions for Stainless Steel Plate
Coils from Belgium (July 18, 2005)).
197. Id. at 1346.
198. Id. at 1346.
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Commerce’s liquidation instructions were contrary to law.
The
lower court reasoned that “[p]laintiffs can not [sic] be expected to
raise a challenge on an issue before it ripens or is revealed,” and “that
Commerce may not impose duties on goods that” it has determined
“are outside the scope of an antidumping or countervailing duty
200
order.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International
Trade and rejected the government’s argument that Arcelor failed to
201
exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.
The court
reasoned that because the first administrative review “did not define
what criteria should be applied to determine whether particular steel
was Belgian in origin[,] nor did it state which entries were subject to
antidumping or countervailing duties[,]” Arcelor had no relevant
grounds on which to challenge the first administrative review, and
202
thus, no administrative remedies to exhaust.
The Federal Circuit
viewed the government’s real argument as frustration that importers
should not enjoy the ability to make such belated country-of-origin
corrections, but held that “neither the [antidumping and
countervailing duty] statute[,] nor the regulations impose a time
limit on the correction of errors such as those made here by
203
Arcelor.”
Therefore, the Federal Circuit found Commerce’s liquidation
instructions for entries subject to the first administrative review as
contrary to its long-established precedent that SSPC hot rolled in one
country, and not further cold rolled elsewhere, originates in the
204
country where it undergoes hot rolling.
In this case, Arcelor and
the fourth administrative review liquidation instructions correctly
deemed SSPC hot rolled in Germany and not further cold rolled in
205
Belgium, and therefore not of Belgian origin.
206
the Federal Circuit
In NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States,
reviewed Commerce’s decision, in a second sunset review of an
antidumping duty order on ball bearings, to continue the order while
reducing the dumping margins to levels lower than before the order

199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Ugine & ALZ Belgium, N.V. v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 2d
1333, 1343 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007)).
201. Id. at 1349.
202. Id. at 1348.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1349.
205. Id. at 1346.
206. 557 F. 3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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207

took effect. The Federal Circuit affirmed Commerce’s decision to
continue the order, but vacated and remanded the decision to
208
reduce the subject dumping margins.
JTEKT Corporation and Koyo Corporation of U.S.A. (JTEKT)
argued that Commerce’s second sunset review determination failed
to consider evidence that JTEKT submitted, specifically that import
levels did not decrease substantially, that a U.S. recession caused any
209
decreases in JTEKT’s import levels around 2001, and that, more
broadly, “substantial evidence” did not support Commerce’s
210
decision. The Federal Circuit found it consistent with Commerce’s
Statement of Administrative Action and Sunset Policy Bulletin to
continue an antidumping duty order based merely on dumping at
any level above de minimis, and thus found it unnecessary to consider
JTEKT’s argument that Commerce failed to consider its evidence of
211
Because JTEKT did not challenge the validity of
import volume.
the Statement of Administrative Action or the Sunset Policy Bulletin,
212
the Federal Circuit inferred their validity.
Moreover, the Federal
213
Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States
that 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(i) “does not require us to invalidate a decision
of Commerce if Commerce failed to explicitly address a party’s non214
dispositive argument.”
The Timken Company argued on cross-appeal that Commerce
both lacked substantial evidence to reduce the subject dumping
margins and deviated from its established methodology in the
215
process.
Noting for example that Commerce did not specify what
data it used to determine certain importer’s import volumes, the
Federal Circuit agreed with Timken and found that:
it is difficult to square many of Commerce’s statements that the
Japanese importers’ levels of imports were steady or increasing with
207. Id. at 1318, 1320. See generally Antifriction Bearings (Other than Tapered
Roller Bearings) & Parts Thereof From Japan, 54 Fed. Reg. 18,873, 19,101 (Dep’t of
Commerce May 3, 1989).
208. NMB Singapore Ltd., 557 F.3d at 1331.
209. Id. at 1320.
210. Id.; see Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (holding that the Federal Circuit will support Commerce’s decisions unless
they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in
accordance with law” (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2000))).
211. NMB Singapore Ltd., 557 F.3d at 1320–22 (citing Policies Regarding the
Conduct of Five-year (“Sunset”) Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Orders, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,817, 18,871 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 16, 1998); 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4213–14).
212. Id. at 1322.
213. 421 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
214. NMB Singapore Ltd., 557 F.3d at 1323 (citing Timken, 421 F.3d at 1357).
215. Id. at 1323.
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the actual data before Commerce, even if we accepted the
arguments that Commerce could permissibly consider different
types of import data and different segments of the five-year review
216
period for different importers while ignoring pre-order levels.

The Federal Circuit further agreed that Commerce deviated from
its past practice of comparing pre-order volumes to volumes during
the life of an antidumping order because Commerce only considered
217
volumes during the life of the order in this instance. The Federal
Circuit also vacated and remanded Commerce’s recalculation of its
dumping margins for further analysis of whether Commerce correctly
substituted respondents’ export data for Japanese companies’ U.S.
218
market share, the traditional relevant metric.
219
In Sango International L.P. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed Commerce’s determination, on remand, that Sango
International L.P.’s gas meter swivels and nuts fell within the scope of
the antidumping duty order on certain malleable iron pipe fittings
220
(MIPFs) from China.
Sango’s products came under the scope of
the subject antidumping duty order because Customs classified them
upon entry under HTSUS subheading 7307.19.90.60, which covers
“[t]ube or pipe fittings (for example, couplings, elbows, sleeves), of
221
iron or steel: Cast fittings: Other: Other Threaded.”
Sango
requested classification under HTSUS subheading 9028.90.00 as parts
222
for and accessories to gas meters, but Customs denied this request.
216. Id. at 1326.
217. Id. at 1329; accord Save Domestic Oil, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.3d 1278,
1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[I]f Commerce has a routine practice for addressing like
situations, it must either apply that practice or provide a reasonable explanation as to
why it departs therefrom.” (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983))).
218. See NMB Singapore Ltd., 557 F.3d at 1331 (“[I]f it is the case that the U.S.
market share of the Japanese companies could be determined from the data before
Commerce, then Commerce’s determination went against the practice it had
established as of the time of the decision under review.”).
219. 567 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
220. Id. at 1364. See generally Certain Malleable Iron Pipe Fittings from the
People’s Republic of China, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,376, 69,377 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec.
12, 2003). The Federal Circuit remanded Commerce’s first scope determination in
this matter for lack of substantial evidence to support the determination. See Sango
Int’l, L.P. v. United States, 484 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (considering the
factors set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) as required by the Federal Circuit,
Commerce reached the same decision on remand); Sango Int’l L.P. v. United States,
556 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1332–38 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008), aff’d, 567 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (detailing the § 351.225(k)(2) factors: “(i) the physical characteristics of the
product; (ii) the expectations of the ultimate purchasers; (iii) the ultimate use of the
product; (iv) the channels of trade in which the product is sold; and (v) the manner
in which the product is advertised and displayed.”) (quoting 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.225(k)(2) (2008)).
221. Sango Int’l Ltd., 567 F.3d at 1359.
222. Id.
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Commerce’s remand determination followed the requirements of
19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) and generally determined that Sango’s gas
meter swivels and nuts cannot be used without each other and were
properly classified in the tariff heading that subjected them to the
223
applicable antidumping duty order.
The Court of International
Trade affirmed Commerce’s remand determination, accepting its
arguments that Sango’s parts are distributed through the same
avenues of trade as MIPFs and to purchasers of MIPFs, among other
224
factors.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Sango argued that both
Commerce’s decision to treat its products collectively and
Commerce’s remand determination lacked substantial evidence in
225
the record.
The Federal Circuit rejected Sango’s first argument
because it agreed with Commerce and the Court of International
Trade that Sango’s gas meter swivels and nuts could not be used
without each other, and the fact that Sango packaged and sold the
226
products separately was unavailing as a matter of law.
Sango’s
second argument failed because the Federal Circuit read the
antidumping duty order as including MIPFs that connect a pipe or a
pipe fitting to an apparatus, which Sango’s gas meters and swivels
227
did. The Federal Circuit further found that Sango’s gas meters and
swivels and the MIPFs subject to the antidumping duty order shared
physical characteristics and were marketed through the same
228
channels of commerce.
229
In Huvis Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed
Commerce’s use of a constructed market price in valuing Huvis
Corporation’s imported polyester staple fiber subject to an
230
antidumping duty order. Huvis appealed after Commerce issued its
231
findings in the fifth administrative review.

223. Id. at 1359–60 (finding that Sango’s products must bond together to
function, that Sango’s own scope ruling request treated them as one collective
product, that gas meter nuts cannot be used without gas meter swivels, and that they
are generally “never used individually”).
224. Id. at 1362.
225. Id.; see also Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (establishing that the Federal Circuit will defer to Commerce’s scope
rulings unless it finds them to be “unsupported by substantial evidence on the
record, or otherwise not in accordance with law” (quoting 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994))).
226. Sango Int’l Ltd., 567 F.3d at 1363.
227. Id. at 1363–64.
228. Id. at 1364.
229. 570 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
230. Id. at 1353.
231. Id. at 1348.
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Huvis purchased all of a key component used in the production of
polyester staple fiber from affiliated companies during this period,
which triggered the “major input rule” under 19 U.S.C.
232
§§ 1677b(f)(2)–(3) and 19 C.F.R. § 351.407(b). The “major input
rule” requires Commerce to determine the value of an affiliatesourced key production component as the higher of (1) the transfer
233
price, (2) the market value, or (3) the cost of production.
As it had done previously, during the fifth administrative review,
Commerce requested that Huvis submit the transfer price, market
234
value and cost of production for the major inputs at issue.
For
qualified-grade and purified terephthalic acids—the major inputs at
issue—Huvis submitted only transfer price and cost of production,
explaining that its supplier considered market price data
235
proprietary.
Though Commerce had, in three of four cases,
previously applied the major input rule for only the two measures
Huvis supplied, for the fifth administrative review Commerce chose
236
to construct a market price from “facts available.”
In this case,
Commerce arrived at a market price by adding an average profit rate,
taken from suppliers’ submitted financial statements, and added it to
237
Huvis’ submitted cost of production. This constructed market price
exceeded both the transfer price and cost of production submitted by
Huvis, and thus Commerce used it to value the subject major
238
inputs.
Huvis filed suit in the Court of International Trade to challenge
Commerce’s constructed market price as unsupported by substantial
239
evidence.
The Court of International Trade found that
Commerce’s constructed market value—which relied on Huvis’ own
data—was supported by substantial evidence and did not apply any
240
adverse inferences against Huvis. The Court of International Trade
nonetheless remanded to Commerce based on the court’s finding
that Commerce’s use of constructed market price was inconsistent
232. Id. at 1348–49.
233. Id. at 1349 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 351.407(b) (2009)).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id. (“Commerce is required to use the facts otherwise available in reaching
the applicable determination” if “necessary information is not available on the
record” (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Commerce may not draw “adverse inferences” against an importer, absent that
importer’s failure to cooperate with the investigation.
Id. at 1350 (citing
§ 1677e(b)).
237. Id. at 1350.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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with its past practice of simply using the highest available price
241
measure.
On remand, Commerce stood by its methodology and explained
that it only now realized it had enough data to construct a market
price, and that doing so provided “a more complete analysis under
the major input rule, and result[ed] in a more accurate calculation of
242
Huvis’s dumping margin.”
The Court of International Trade
accepted this methodology and affirmed Commerce’s constructed
243
market value determination.
Huvis appealed to the Federal Circuit, again under the theory that
the constructed market price was unsupported by substantial
244
evidence and contrary to law.
Huvis argued that Commerce’s
standard practice was to look only at the available measures and not
to construct a major input value, which made it the “law of the
proceeding” and a practice that Huvis should expect from Commerce
245
during the fifth administrative review.
Finally, Huvis argued that
Commerce’s methodology of adding cost of production to profit
renders the cost of production variable in the major input test
246
meaningless, since the market value would always be higher.
First, the Federal Circuit found that Commerce’s constructed
market value methodology in this case was permissible under the
247
antidumping statute.
The Federal Circuit deemed Commerce’s
addition of an average profit to cost of production reasonable “since
there is no suggestion here that product sales were unprofitable or
248
that the profit margins were unusually low.” The court also found it
reasonable for Commerce to differentiate between varying grades of
terephthalic acids because Huvis’ own transfer price data showed that
249
it paid more for higher grade materials.

241. Id.
242. Huvis Corp. v. United States, No. 06-00380, 2008 WL 2977890, at *2 (Ct. Int’l
Trade Aug. 5, 2008), aff’d 570 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
243. Huvis, 570 F.3d at 1351.
244. Id.
245. Id. Huvis also argued that Commerce’s construction of a market price
amounted to a penalty on Huvis for failing to provide market value data that,
because its suppliers would not share, Huvis could not provide. Id.
246. Id. at 1351–52.
247. See id. at 1353 (“[T]he new policy is permissible under the statute, . . . there
are good reasons for it, and . . . the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious
change of course adequately indicates.” (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1804 (2009))).
248. Id. at 1354.
249. Id.
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Second, the Federal Circuit ruled that Commerce had a “good
250
In this case, the court
reason” to deviate from its past practice.
endorsed Commerce’s determination that it could increase the
accuracy of its estimated market prices—and consequently its
251
dumping margins—by calculating the market price for Huvis. The
court rejected Huvis’s argument that Commerce could not abruptly
change course, as Huvis offered no evidence of actual detrimental
252
reliance.
Thus, Commerce was permitted to proceed with its fifth
administrative review based on a calculated market price for certain
253
of Huvis’ terephthalic acids.
254
Ningbo Dafa Chemical Fiber Co. v. United States concerned an
antidumping duty investigation of recycled polyester staple fiber
255
(PSF) from China.
Commerce issued a final determination
imposing a 4.86% dumping rate for Ningbo Dafa Chemical Fiber
256
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Court of International
Co.
Trade and affirmed Commerce’s final determination, finding that it
257
was supported by substantial evidence.
PSF is made in part from recycled polyethylene terephthalate
(PET) bottle flake, and the color of the PET flake used in production
258
corresponds with the color of the finished PSF.
Commerce
requested the invoices from Ningbo’s market economy purchases of
PET flake during its investigation, in furtherance of its obligation to
259
use the “best available information” to value the subject PSF.
In
response, Ningbo gave Commerce fifty-eight invoices from its
qualifying market economy PET purchases, but very few of those
260
identified the color of PET flake purchased.
After Commerce
unsuccessfully made a second inquiry for invoices that matched
purchase price with PET flake color, Commerce made its
250. Id. (citing Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1811; Nippon Steel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 494 F.3d 1371, 1377–78 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
251. Id. at 1355.
252. Id. The Court had previously been persuaded by the company’s claims of
detrimental reliance when this reliance could be demonstrated. See Fox Television,
129 S. Ct. at 1811 (providing that in changing a policy an agency must consider the
reliance interests at stake); Shikoku Chems. Corp. v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 417,
421 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992) (overturning Commerce’s use of a new methodology since
respondents demonstrated reliance on the old methodology).
253. Huvis, 570 F.3d at 1356.
254. 580 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
255. Id. at 1249. PSF is used to stuff consumer items, such as sleeping bags,
mattresses, pillows, and furniture. Id. at 1250.
256. Id. at 1253.
257. Id. at 1262.
258. Id. at 1250.
259. Id. at 1250–51 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (2006)).
260. Ningbo, 580 F.3d at 1251.
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determination based on “neutral partial ‘facts available’”
261
inferences.
First, the Federal Circuit upheld Commerce’s use of “facts
available” inferences in this case because “Ningbo did not provide the
requested information in the form and manner requested” and
because Commerce reasonably determined the color of PET flake to
262
be relevant to its value.
The court emphasized that the reason
behind a respondent’s failure to provide information reasonably
requested by Commerce is “of no moment”—including if the
respondent is from a non-market economy country—and the failure
263
alone allows Customs to make facts available inferences.
Second, the Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence
264
supported Commerce’s final determination. The court deferred to
Commerce’s conclusion that it required color-specific PET flake
values and that color-specific, surrogate PET flake values from India
265
did not exist.
The Federal Circuit then decided that Commerce’s
application of its neutral facts available inferences was supported by
266
Noting that Commerce’s methodologies are
substantial evidence.
“presumptively correct” under Thai Pineapple Public Co. v. United
267
268
States and Florida Citrus Mutual v. United States, Ningbo’s claim that
it would have been impossible to produce color-specific PET flake
269
invoices as requested by Customs was not persuasive. In the court’s
view, Commerce had incomplete information to work with and acted
reasonably when it used the best information available to assign
270
colors to the market economy invoices that lacked colors.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence
supported Commerce’s color-specific PET flake valuations, both
because the incomplete information provided by Ningbo made an
exact correlation between Ningbo’s PET flake purchases and its PSF
271
production possible and because Commerce’s calculated values
matched up with the prices derived from a co-respondent that did

261. Id. (citing Certain Polyester Staple Fiber from the People’s Republic of
China, 72 Fed. Reg. 19,690, 19,691 (Apr. 19, 2007)).
262. Id. at 1252. The court also noted that Commerce applied neutral, rather
than adverse, facts available. Id.
263. Id. at 1254.
264. Id. at 1257.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1256.
267. 187 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
268. 550 F.3d 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
269. Ningbo, 580 F.3d at 1259–60.
270. Id. at 1261.
271. Id.
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272

provide color-specific PET flake invoices.
Thus, Commerce’s final
273
determination and dumping margin for Ningbo were affirmed.
The Federal Circuit upheld an “adverse facts available” (AFA)
274
antidumping ruling in PAM, S.P.A. v. United States.
The appeal
considered the Court of International Trade’s affirmance of
Commerce’s determination of a 45.49% AFA margin for PAM S.P.A.
(PAM), an Italian producer and exporter of pasta, in compliance
with the Court of International Trade’s earlier instructions on
remand to recalculate an AFA antidumping margin in accordance
275
with 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c).
This appeal concerned the sixth administrative review, during
which PAM filed questionnaire responses with Commerce and
276
participated in the verification of its sales databases. However, PAM
failed to report sales to AGEA, a governmental entity, and a set of
invoices for pasta shipped directly from an external warehouse to
277
PAM’s customers. These omissions represented approximately two278
thirds of PAM’s total domestic sales.
Based on these omissions, Commerce determined that PAM failed
279
to cooperate with its investigation and applied an AFA margin. The
AFA margin of 45.49% applied to PAM represented the highest
margin applied to any party that had been previously upheld in the
280
course of the investigation. PAM challenged Commerce’s decision
and the Court of International Trade remanded, finding that
281
Commerce had not “adequately corroborated” the subject margin.
On remand, Commerce took into account PAM’s databases but
found the same margin that it found in the sixth administrative
282
review.
Noting that “Congress has made very clear the importance of
accurate and complete reporting of home market sales to the
Department of Commerce,” the Federal Circuit found that
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1262.
274. 582 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
275. Id. at 1338. See generally Notice of Antidumping Duty Order and Amended
Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Certain Pasta from Italy, 61
Fed. Reg. 38,547 (Dep’t of Commerce July 24, 1996) (discussing obligations of
parties subject to administrative protective orders).
276. PAM, 582 F.3d at 1338.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. (citing Notice of Preliminary Results: For the Sixth Administrative Review
of the Antidumping Duty Order on Certain Pasta from Italy, 68 Fed. Reg. 47,020
(Aug. 7, 2003)).
280. Id. at 1338.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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“Commerce’s discretion in applying an AFA margin is particularly
great when a respondent is uncooperative by failing to provide or
283
The court identified substantial
withholding information.”
evidence for the 45.49% AFA margin based on Commerce’s finding
that at least twenty-nine sales occurred with margins at or above
284
45.49%.
The court rejected PAM’s argument that its high margin
sales were mere outliers, as 0.5% of total sales, based on Ta Chen
285
Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States.
In that case, the Federal
Circuit held that, “[s]o long as the data is corroborated,” Commerce
may choose to rely on a small subset of data to support an AFA
286
margin.
287
Qingdao Taifa Group Co. v. United States required the Federal
Circuit to decide whether the Court of International Trade had the
power to halt liquidation of entries for importers of hand trucks
made and exported by Qingdao Taifa Group Co. (Taifa) so that Taifa
288
could challenge antidumping duties imposed on it by Commerce.
Various U.S. companies purchased Taifa hand trucks in 2005 and
2006 and paid cash deposits pursuant to the applicable antidumping
duty order, but Taifa did no importation of its own and thus paid no
289
cash deposits directly.
Commerce later notified all interested
290
parties of the opportunity to request a review of the entries.
Commerce initiated a review based in part on Taifa’s request and
291
sent personnel to China to visit Taifa and interview its employees.
During its visit to China, Commerce detected “concealment,
destruction, and tampering with responsive documents” and, as a
result, applied an AFA margin under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) and
assigned the general antidumping duty rate used for China, which
was much higher than the rate generally applied to individual
292
exporters.
Taifa challenged this determination at the Court of
International Trade, which granted Taifa’s motion for a preliminary
injunction and halted liquidation pending the outcome of its

283. Id. at 1339–40 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (2006)); see also F. Illi De Cecco Di
Filippo Fara S. Martino S.P.A. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(explaining that Commerce is inclined to select adverse facts to deter companies
from being uncooperative).
284. PAM, 582 F.3d at 1340.
285. 298 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
286. Id. at 1339 (citing Illi De Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032).
287. 581 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
288. Id. at 1377.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1377–78.
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293

review.
Certain domestic producers who later intervened in the
Court of International Trade action appealed to the Federal
294
Circuit.
The Federal Circuit reviewed the Court of International Trade’s
295
grant of an injunction under an “abuse of discretion” standard.
Pursuant to this standard, the lower court will only be reversed if it
“made a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors or
exercised its discretion based on an error of law or clearly erroneous
296
fact finding.”
As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit rejected the government’s
argument that the intervening domestic producers had waived their
right to participate because they did not intervene until after the
297
injunction was granted.
In affirming the Court of International Trade’s decision, the
Federal Circuit determined that Taifa faced irreparable forfeiture in
298
the event that an injunction was not granted.
The court further
reasoned that no other statutory framework or process existed for
Taifa to challenge the validity of Commerce’s chosen antidumping
duty margins, and thus the company would have no recourse after
299
liquidation was completed.
Moreover, the court found that the
legislative history of the antidumping statute supports an injunction,
as “[t]he Tariff Act . . . expressly contemplates protections for foreign
300
as well as domestic manufacturers.”
And the court finally
determined that Taifa demonstrated “at least a ‘fair chance of success
301
on the merits.’” Though “no party proffers any significant evidence
302
about the merits of the imposed tariff rate,” Taifa at least claimed
that it should not be subject to the China-wide rate because it is not a
303
government-controlled entity. Based on this limited argument, the
293. Id. at 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009). In fact, the Court of International Trade
granted the requested injunction before the deadline passed for the government to
file its reply. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1379 (quoting Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331,
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
296. Id. (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Chiron Corp., 384 F.3d 1326,
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
297. See id. (reasoning that the domestic producers could not control the fact that
the Court of International Trade ruled before the deadline passed for parties to file
oppositions).
298. Id. at 1380.
299. Id.
300. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 96-249 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 636).
301. Id. at 1381 (quoting U.S. Ass’n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. Dep’t of
Commerce, 413 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
302. Id.
303. Id.
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Federal Circuit saw no cause to overturn the Court of International
Trade’s finding that Taifa demonstrated some likelihood of success
304
Therefore, the Federal Circuit sustained the
on the merits.
305
injunction granted by the Court of International Trade.
B. International Trade Commission
The Federal Circuit issued only one decision in 2009 arising out of
the ITC, and it related to the constitutionality of the now-repealed
306
Byrd Amendment.
The case discussed below continued to the
Federal Circuit, even though Congress repealed the statute, because
the private parties’ claim for distributions predated the Amendment’s
307
repeal.
In 2009, the Federal Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the
308
Byrd Amendment,
which provided for the distribution of
antidumping duties collected by the federal government to certain
“affected domestic producers” of the dumped goods, against First
309
and Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment challenges.
SKF USA (SKF)
challenged the ITC’s 2005 denial of its request for Byrd Amendment
310
The ITC reasoned in its denial that SKF was not
distributions.
eligible for distributions because it was not a petitioner and had not
311
supported the petition resulting in the antidumping duty order.
The Court of International Trade agreed with SKF and found that
the Byrd Amendment’s language that limited eligible claimants to
petitioners or supporters of the petition violated the equal protection
312
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit declined to decide threshold
questions of jurisdiction and simply assumed that the Court of
International Trade had jurisdiction to hear SKF’s claim and that the

304. Id.
305. Id. at 1382.
306. See SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 556 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 583 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (concluding
that the Byrd Amendment is constitutional).
307. See id. at 1341–42 (discussing the history of the Byrd Amendment).
308. Congress repealed the Byrd Amendment in 2006, but the case discussed
herein concerned distributions allegedly earned prior to the Amendment’s repeal.
See Repeal of Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601,
120 Stat. 4, 154 (2006) (noting that actions prior to the repeal will still be assessed
under the Byrd Amendment).
309. SKF, 556 F.3d at 1340. An “affected domestic producer” is “a petitioner or
interested party in support of the petition with respect to which an antidumping duty
order . . . has been entered.” 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(b)(1)(A) (2000).
310. SKF, 556 F.3d at 1340.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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claim was not barred by any applicable statute of limitations.
The
Court further determined that, since SKF challenged the Byrd
Amendment as applied to its claim for distributions and not on its
face, the claim could only accrue once SKF filed suit to collect the
314
duties.
Stressing its adherence to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,
the Federal Circuit first considered SKF’s First Amendment
315
argument.
The Court rejected SKF’s argument that the Byrd
Amendment’s restriction of distributions functioned to penalize
domestic producers who declined to speak in support of
antidumping petitions because “[p]arties who are awarded
antidumping distributions under the Byrd Amendment may say
whatever they want about the government’s trade policies generally
or about the particular antidumping investigation, provided they do
316
so outside the context of the proceeding itself.” In this regard, the
Federal Circuit found that the Byrd Amendment, rather than chilling
opposing views, rewards the efforts of domestic producers who aid
317
enforcement.
SKF based its equal protection argument on the theory that no
rational basis for distributing antidumping duties only to domestic
producers that supported an antidumping petition furthered the
318
compensatory purpose of the Byrd Amendment. The government
countered that the Byrd Amendment “identifies a group of
beneficiaries that are entitled to compensation for unfair trade
319
practices” and thus rationally supports its purpose.
The Court of
International Trade agreed with SKF because it saw the antidumping
laws as “designed to benefit entire industries rather than individual
320
companies.” But the Federal Circuit rejected this line of reasoning
and—extending its First Amendment findings to its equal protection
analysis—found that the Byrd Amendment was rationally related to

313. See id. at 1348 (“We assume, but do not decide, that the statute of limitations
in § 2636(i) is jurisdictional . . . .”).
314. Id.
315. See id. at 1349 (recognizing the obligation of courts to construe statutes to
minimize constitutional difficulties).
316. Id. at 1351–52.
317. Id. at 1352. The Federal Circuit, in a lengthy First Amendment discussion,
also found that the Byrd Amendment furthers the legitimate government purpose of
enforcing trade laws and, in fact, often fails to “adequately compensate those who
support such petitions for their efforts.” Id. at 1358.
318. Id. at 1346.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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the legitimate purpose of enforcing U.S. trade laws and rewarding
321
those in the private sector who assist in that enforcement.
In a split decision, the Federal Circuit denied a petition for a panel
rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc on September 29,
322
2009.
CONCLUSION
In 2009, the Federal Circuit issued nineteen precedential
international trade-related decisions that will undoubtedly prove
important to both the import and export community’s day-to-day
business operations and the future activities of Customs, Commerce
and the ITC. The Federal Circuit’s review of international traderelated appeals from the Court of International Trade remains a
small but extremely important body of law, and the Federal Circuit’s
role in creating judicial precedent for the ever-changing regime of
U.S. trade policy and trade regulations is only likely to increase with
time.

321. Id. at 1360.
322. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Patr., 583 F.3d 1340, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (per curiam).

